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Abstract: With the widespread adoption of the quantified self movement, an increasing number
of users rely on mobile applications to monitor their physical activity through their smartphones.
Granting to applications a direct access to sensor data expose users to privacy risks. Indeed,
usually these motion sensor data are transmitted to analytics applications hosted on the cloud
leveraging machine learning models to provide feedback on their health to users. However, nothing
prevents the service provider to infer private and sensitive information about a user such as health
or demographic attributes.
In this paper, we present DySan, a privacy-preserving framework to sanitize motion sensor data
against unwanted sensitive inferences (i.e., improving privacy) while limiting the loss of accuracy on
the physical activity monitoring (i.e., maintaining data utility). To ensure a good trade-off between
utility and privacy, DySan leverages on the framework of Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
to sanitize the sensor data. More precisely, by learning in a competitive manner several networks,
DySan is able to build models that sanitize motion data against inferences on a specified sensitive
attribute (e.g., gender) while maintaining a high accuracy on activity recognition. In addition,
DySan dynamically selects the sanitizing model which maximize the privacy according to the
incoming data. Experiments conducted on real datasets demonstrate that DySan can drastically
limit the gender inference to 47% while only reducing the accuracy of activity recognition by 3%.
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DySan: Assainissement dynamique des données de capteur
de mouvement contre l’inférence d’informations sensibles à
partir de réseaux adversariaux
Résumé : Avec l’adoption généralisée du suivi d’activité, un nombre croissant d’utilisateurs
s’appuient sur des applications mobiles pour surveiller leur activité physique par le biais de leur
smartphone. Le fait d’accorder aux applications un accès direct aux données des capteurs expose
les utilisateurs à des risques pour leur vie privée. En effet, ces données de capteurs de mouvement
sont généralement transmises à des applications d’analyse hébergées sur le cloud, qui exploitent
des modèles d’apprentissage machine pour fournir aux utilisateurs un retour d’information sur
leur santé. Cependant, rien n’empêche le fournisseur de services d’inférer des informations privées
et potentiellement sensibles sur un utilisateur, telles que des attributs démographiques ou de
santé.
Dans cet article, nous présentons DySan, un système de préservation de la vie privée pour
assainir les données provenant de capteurs de mouvement contre les inférence non désirées
d’informations sensibles (c’est-à-dire améliorer la vie privée) tout en limitant la perte de pré-
cision sur la surveillance de l’activité physique (c’est-à-dire maintenir une certaine utilité dans
les données protégées). Pour garantir un bon compromis entre utilité et respect de la vie privée,
DySan s’appuie sur des Réseaux génératifs Adversariaux (GAN) pour assainir les données is-
sues des capteurs. Plus précisément, en apprenant de manière compétitive plusieurs réseaux,
DySan est capable de construire des modèles d’apprentissage machine qui assainissent les don-
nées de mouvement contre l’inférence d’un attribut sensible spécifié (par exemple, le genre) tout
en maintenant une grande précision sur la reconnaissance d’activité. De plus, DySan sélectionne
dynamiquement le modèle d’assainissement qui maximise la confidentialité en fonction des don-
nées entrantes. Les expériences menées sur des ensembles de données réels montrent que DySan
peut limiter considérablement l’inférence du genre jusqu’à 47% tout en n’impactant la précision
de la reconnaissance d’activité que de 3%.
Mots-clés : vie privée, intelligence artificielle, transparence, données de santé, confidentialité
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1 Introduction
The integration of motion sensors in smartphones and wearables has been accompanied by the
growth of the quantified self movement. For instance nowadays, users increasingly use these
devices to monitor their physical activity. Usually, the motion sensor data are transmitted to
analytics applications hosted on the cloud leveraging machine learning models to compute heath
statistics about users. While this analysis can bring many benefits in term of health [1, 2, 3],
it can also lead to privacy breaches by exposing personal information regarding the individual
concerned. Indeed, a large range of inferences can be done from motion sensor data including
sensitive ones such as demographic and health-related attributes [4, 5].
Consider for instance the scenario in which Alice, a woman, use a fitness application on her
smartphone to monitor her physical activity. The application performs the activity recognition
as well as activity monitoring on the cloud. However, Alice has no guarantee that her data are
not processed to infer other information for targeting or marketing purposes. Another example
is the new trend of insurance companies that propose discount to clients if they accept to use a
connected device to follow their activity along the days. These data can be used to provide a
personalized coaching for better health management but also for early detection of a pathology,
which can negatively impact the evolution of the insurance cost or lead to other discriminations.
The goal of this work is to provide a solution which sanitizes the motion sensor data in such a
way that it hides sensitive attributes while still preserving the activity information contained in
the data.
To achieve this objective, we design DySan, that leverages on the framework of Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs) to sanitize the sensor data. More precisely, by learning in a
competitive manner several networks, DySan is able to build models sanitizing motion data to
prevent inferences on a specified sensitive attribute while maintaining a high level of activity
recognition. In addition, by limiting the data distortion between the raw and sanitized data,
DySan also maintains a high level of information in the sensor data to conduct further analysis
(like step counting). Finally, each time DySan processes incoming data, it is able to dynamically
selects the sanitizing model which limits as much as possible the risk of inference of the sensitive
attribute.
The evaluation of DySan on real datasets, in which the gender is considered as the sensitive
information to hide, demonstrates that DySan can drastically limit the gender inference up to
47% while only reducing the accuracy of activity recognition of 3%. In addition, by limiting the
data distortion, we show that DySan also better preserves the sensor data utility compared to
state-of-the-art approaches with respect to other analytical tasks such as estimating the number
of steps. Finally, we show that the dynamic models selection of DySan provides an adaptation
of the sanitization according to the incoming data in order to respect the user expectation in
terms of utility and privacy trade-off.
Finally, our implementation of DySan as well as the considered datasets to assess its perfor-
mance are publicly available 1.
The paper is organized as follows. First, the problem definition and the considered system
model are described in Section 2. Then, DySan is presented in Section 3 before reviewing the
experimental setting as well as the results obtained, respectively in Section 4 and Section 5.
Finally, the related work is reviewing in Section 6 before concluding in Section 7.
1DySan: https://github.com/DynamicSanitizer/DySan
RR n° 9325
4 Boutet & Frindel & others
2 Problem definition and system model
We consider a mobile application installed on the user’s smartphone aiming to monitor its physical
activity. The smartphone of the user is assumed to be trusted by assumption. More precisely,
we consider that DySan is deployed in a trust zone of the smartphone to avoid the mobile
application to have a direct access to the motion sensor but only from the output of DySan
(thus ensuring that the mobile application use only sanitized data). Afterwards, the mobile
application sends the motion data to a server hosted on the cloud. This server leverages machine
learning models such as classifiers to identify the activity of the user or to estimate other physical
activity features (e.g., number of steps). However, we consider this server as untrusted in the
sense that it can also try to infer additional sensitive information from the motion data. In this
paper, we consider the gender as the sensitive attribute.
We consider raw motion data (denoted by A) captured through accelerometer and gyroscope
that sample 3-axial signals with a frequency of 50 Hz. To enable activity recognition over time,
the raw motion data are split in t sliding windows, where each sliding window is considered as
being a sample of a single activity. Here, we consider 4 dynamic activities (i.e., walking, running,
climbing and descending stairs) so that the length of sliding windows is chosen to match a walking
cycle of two steps. Knowing that in average the cadence range of walking is not less than 1.5
steps per second [6], the window length is chosen to be 2.5 seconds with an overlap of 50 %.
We assume a population of N users and we call D the dataset containing all users data. This
dataset includes the raw motion data as well as the label associated to the activity performed
by the user (denoted by a multivalued attribute Y ) and the binary sensitive attribute (denoted
by S ). Each measurement is timestamped. The dataset is therefore D = (X1, . . . , Xt), in which
X ∈ {A,Y,S}. We do not consider any correlation between the sensitive attribute S and the
activity performed by the user Y.
The objective of DySan is to protect the user motion sensor data against inferences on
sensitive attribute while maintaining as much as utility as possible. More formally, we aim at
learning a set of transformation functions Sanα,λ,β for various hyperparameters values α, λ, and
β in which each function will transform the original dataset D into D¯ = Sanα,λ,β (D) = {X¯1,...,t}.
This transformation functions set is learned so that any model Disc trained to predict S from
the sanitized data A¯ will fail while an activity predictor Pred trained on the same data A¯ is able
to maintain an accuracy close to the original data. To further preserve the utility of D¯, we also
constrain the data sanitization by ensuring that the distortion between the original and sanitized
data is minimized.
Lastly, as the set of hyperparameters α, λ, β which provides the best utility and privacy trade-
off is different for every user and can changes according to the incoming raw data, the choice of
the considered transformation function Sanα,λ,β is dynamically chosen locally on the smartphone
of the user every time incoming data are processed.
3 DySan: Dynamic sanitizer
In this section, we start by providing an overview of our solution (Section 3.1) before developing in
more detail how DySan builds sanitizer models (Section 3.2) in the training phase (Section 3.3)
as well as during the online phase (Section 3.4).
3.1 Overview
An overview of DySan is depicted in Figure 1.To avoid an unwanted exploitation of the motion
sensor data, these data are firstly sanitized by DySan before being transmitted to the mobile
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Figure 1: Overview of dynamic sanitizer.
application. More precisely, this sanitization removes the correlations with the gender in the raw
data while preserving the information necessary to detect the activity performed by users. In
addition, this sanitization limits the distortion between the raw and sanitized data to preserve
the utility for other analytical tasks. Then, the resulting protected data are sent to an analytics
application hosted on the cloud exploiting machine learning models to classify the activity of the
user and compute statistics related to their physical activity.
Before exploit DySan, multiple sanitizing models corresponding to various utility-privacy
trade-offs are built during the training phase. Once these multiple sanitizing models are de-
ployed on the smartphone, DySan dynamically selects the model corresponding to the incoming
processed data. Both phases, the training and the online phase are summarized in Figure 2 and
explained in the following subsections.
Figure 2: Dynamic Sanitizer framework during the training phase (left) and the online phase
(right).
3.2 Building multiple sanitizing models
The training phase is performed only once and aims to prepare multiple sanitizing models. This
training is performed with a reference dataset used for activity recognition (i.e., MotionSense
dataset described in Section 4.1). As shown in Figure 2, DySan is composed of multiple building
blocks: 1) a sanitizer, 2) a discriminator, 3) a predictor, 4) a distortion measurement, and 5) a
multi-objective loss function.
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3.2.1 Discriminator (Disc)
The discriminator guides the sanitizer through the process of removing information related to
the sensitive attribute S ∈ {0, 1}. We used a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), which is
among the most suited neural networks to capture time-invariant features in time series [7]. The
architecture of this CNN is presented in Appendix A.1. The discriminator is trained to infer
the sensitive information from the output of the sanitizer (Section 3.2.4). The training of the
discriminator is based on a loss function measuring the Balanced Error Rate (BER) [8] defined
as :
BER(Disc(A¯, Y¯), s) =
1
2
(
1∑
s=0
P (Disc(A¯, Y¯) 6= s|S = s)), (1)
Note that BER ranges between 0 and 0.5, where a value close to 0 corresponds to a perfect
accuracy for the prediction of the sensitive attribute. This loss will be called LossSensitive
thereafter.
3.2.2 Predictor (Pred)
The predictor aims at helping the sanitizer in preserving as much as possible information about
the activities. We also use a CNN that has been optimized for predicting the user activity from
the sanitized data. The architecture of this CNN is presented in Appendix A.2 The predictor
is trained to maximise the accuracy in predicting activities from the output of the sanitizer
(Section 3.2.4). To do so, we used again the balanced error rate as the loss function that should
be minimized: BER(Pred(A¯, Y¯), y). This loss will be called LossActivities thereafter.
3.2.3 Distortion measurement
The last constraint on the sanitizer is the minimization of data distortion between the raw data
and sanitized data. Specifically, this distortion should be limited to keep enough information in
the motion data for subsequent analytical tasks. The distortion is measured through the L1 loss
function (denoted l1 ) applied independently on each data-dimension. This loss function for two
vectors A and A¯ is defined as follows:
l1(A, A¯) =
1
NA
NA∑
j=1
|aj − a¯j |, (2)
where aj ∈ A and NA the number of dimensions in A.
3.2.4 Sanitizer (San)
The sanitizer modifies the raw data to remove information correlated to the sensitive attribute
while maintaining useful information for activity detection. Since the raw and sanitized data live
in the same space, we implemented the sanitizer as an auto-encoder. An auto-encoder is a neural
network performing a dimension reduction of the signal to delete irrelevant sensitive information
before trying to reconstruct the input based on an multi-objective function. The sanitizer takes
into account the feedback of the discriminator, predictor and distortion measurement to output
the sanitized version of the input raw data. More precisely, these feedbacks are combined into a
multi-objective loss function that should be minimized. The architecture of this neural network
is presented in Appendix A.3.
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3.2.5 Multi-objective loss function
The multi-objective loss function JSan drives the transformation performed by the auto-encoder
to generated the sanitized data A¯. This loss function takes into account three components, the
capacity to detect the activity of the user (i.e., the output of the predictor), the capacity to
detect the sensitive attribute (i.e., the output of the discriminator), and the level of distortion
introduced in the sanitized signal compared to the raw signal. More formally, the multi-objective
is defined as follows:
JSan (D, San, Disc, Pred) = {α ∗ ds(S, Disc(San(D))),
λ ∗ dp(Y, Pred(San(D))),
β ∗ dr(D,San(D))},
where ds(x) =
1
2
− LossSensitive, dp = LossActivities and dr = {l1(Ai, A¯i), . . .} with i rep-
resenting each data dimension. The
1
2
term in ds(x) comes from the objective of maximizing
the error of the discriminator, since the sanitizer aims at transforming the data so that the
discriminator is no more able to infer sensitive information.
The gradient descent is applied on JSan to minimize each of its component. Note that
each loss term is weighted with a hyperparameter: ds, dp and dr are weighted with α, λ and β,
respectively. As we impose the constraint α+λ+β = 1, we only control α and λ hyperparameters,
leaving β = 1−(α+λ). α represents the relative importance given to the privacy while λ controls
the utility (i.e., the quality of activity detection). We believe this setup is more realistic, as end
users can control the utility and privacy trade-off.
3.3 Training Phase
During the training phase, we build a model for each set of possible value for α and λ in order
to explore the entire domain of the multi-objective loss function. This exploration will allow
DySan to dynamically test and select the best models for the incoming data in the online phase.
The training procedure is resumed in Algorithm 1.
In order to optimize the utility and privacy trade-off for a specific set of value for α and λ (line
1, Algorithm 1), the three neural networks which composed DySan are trained in an adversarial
manner. This adversarial training can be seen as a game between the sanitizer on one side and
the predictor and the discriminator on the other side. Those neural networks will compete each
other with opposing objectives until an equilibrium where no one can improve his own objective.
In this competition, the sanitizer is trained to fool the discriminator and to maintained a high
activity detection by the predictor while limiting the data distortion.
We follow the standard training procedure of GANs consisting in alternating iteratively the
training of each individual models with their respective loss function until convergence (i.e., we
do not consider Competitive Gradient Descent [9]).
Specifically, after the initialization (line 1−8) we start by training the sanitizer with the JSan
while the discriminator and the predictor are frozen (lines 11−12). Once the training of the san-
itizer is converged, the predictor and the discriminator are then trained independently with their
respective loss function while the sanitizer is frozen (lines 13 − 20). These two neural networks
are trained until convergence (i.e., the loss is no longer decreased) or if a maximum number of it-
erations is reached, Kpred and Kdisc, respectively. This two-steps process is iteratively performed
until an equilibrium is reached.
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Algorithm 1 DySan training algorithm
1: Input: D, λ, α, max_epoch, batch_size, Kpred, Kdisc.
2: Outputs: San, Disc, Pred.
3: train(M, **trParams): Train the model M using trParams.
4: freeze(M): Freeze the model M parameters and avoid modifications.
5: {Initialisation}
6: San, Disc, Pred, Dd = shuffle(D), Dp = shuffle(D)
7: Iterations = |D|batch_size
8: {Training Procedure}
9: for e = 1 to max_epoch do
10: for i = 1 to Iterations do
11: Sample batch B of size batch_size from D
12: train(San, B, JSan , α, λ, freeze(San), freeze(Disc))
13: for k = 1 to Kpred do
14: Sample batch B of size batch_size from Dp
15: train(Pred, B, LossActivities, freeze(San))
16: end for
17: for k = 1 to Kdisc do
18: Sample batch B of size batch_size from Dd
19: train(Disc, B, LossSensitive, freeze(San))
20: end for
21: end for
22: end for
3.4 Online Phase
Once deployed, DySan is composed of three components (Figure 2): 1) the sanitizer, 2) the
discriminator, and 3) the predictor. Specifically, DySan contains all the models already trained
in the training phase for the sanitized, the predictor and the discriminator. All these models
correspond to all possible utility and privacy trade-off (i.e., set of values for α and λ).
DySan then processes all sanitizer models on the raw incoming data and evaluates the asso-
ciated utility and privacy through both the corresponding discriminator and the predictor. Con-
sequently, given incoming data DySan dynamically tests and selects the model that achieves the
best privacy. This selection is done every time the sanitizer processes incoming data, specifically
a time window of raw motion data.
4 Experimental setup
We evaluate the capacity of DySan to sanitize motion data from sensitive information while
limiting the loss of activity recognition. In this section, we present the datasets used to assess
DySan (Section 4.1), the baselines we compared with (Section 4.2), and the considered evaluation
metrics (Section 4.3).
4.1 Datasets
We used two real datasets to assess DySan: MotionSense and MobiAct which are both publicly
available. These datasets are split in trials with 2/3 of trials for training/validation and 1/3 for
testing. MotionSense includes data sensed from accelerometer (i.e., acceleration and gravity) and
Inria
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gyroscope at a constant frequency of 50Hz collected with an iPhone 6s kept in the participant’s
front pocket [10]. Overall, a total of 24 participants have performed six activities during 15 trials
in the same environment and conditions. The considered activities are going downstairs, going
upstairs, walking, jogging, sitting and standing.
MobiAct [11], in turn, includes data from 58 subjects with more than 2500 trials, all captured
with a smartphone in a pocket. This dataset comprises data recorded from the accelerometer
and gyroscope sensors of a Samsung Galaxy S3 smartphone for subjects performing nine different
types of activities of daily living. In our case we only used the trials that have the same activities
as MotionSense dataset.
4.2 Baselines
To compare the performance of DySan we consider a set of baselines.
ORF: To limit the exposure of the data, the raw signal in this solution [12] is preprocessed on
the user’s smartphone and only relevant features are transmitted to the application hosted on
the cloud. These relevant features are firstly identified according to the target application (e.g.,
activity recognition) and selected either in the temporal or in the frequency domain. Originality
performed to avoid users re-identification, we however use this approach to avoid to detect the
sensitive attribute considered in this paper, the gender. To do that, we firstly identified the most
relevant features correlated to the gender and then applied the methodology of the paper: we
normalized the features in the frequency domain and removed the features in temporal domain
that are not used for the activity classification.
GEN: Similarly to DySan, GEN (Guardian-Estimator-Neutralizer) [13] also uses an adver-
sarial approach to optimize the utility and privacy trade-off. However, this solution does not
follow the standard iterative training procedure of GANs (as described in Section 3.3). More
precisely, the first network, a classifier, is learned once on the raw data to identify both sensitive
and non sensitive information. Then the second one, an auto encoder, is also trained only once
through a loss function which does not take into account the data distortion. Additionally, the
hyperparameters are static for all users. While this solution uses an architecture of neural net-
works slightly different to our, we implement GEN by using our solution but with the following
differences. Firstly the Predictor and the Discriminator are learned on raw data, secondly the
loss function does not take into account the data distortion, and lastly the models used in the
online phase is static and correspond to the best hyperparameters identified during the training
phase.
Olympus: This approach [14] is similar to GEN but two different neural networks are used
to learn the sensitive attributes and to learn sensitive information. In addition, these classifiers
are trained using sanitized data by following an iterative process similar to DySan described
Section 3.3. However, the loss function does not account data distortion and the models (i.e.,
the hyperparameters) are static for all users. While this approach is used for a different context
(i.e., the sensitive attribute is the user identity), we also implement it by using our solution but
the Sanitizer does not take into account the data distortion, and the model used in the online
phase is static and correspond to the best hyperparameters identified during the training phase.
MSDA: This solution [15] can be viewed as an evolution of Olympus where the loss function
driving the training of the auto encoder accounts data distortion. However, the model used in
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the online phase is still static for all users. We also implement this solution by using DySan
without dynamic models selection in the online phase.
4.3 Metrics
We evaluated DySan along both utility and privacy metrics.
Utility In our context of physical activity monitoring, the first considered utility metric is the
accuracy on the prediction of the activity recognition. To do that, we measure the accuracy of
a classifier trained to detect the users activities. More precisely, we use the confusion matrix to
measure the number of correct predictions made by the model over all predictions that it makes.
Its value ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 corresponds to perfect accuracy.
Analytics applications monitoring physical activity usually compute and present many esti-
mators to users. To evaluate this aspect, we compute the number of steps we can detect from
the sanitized signals and compare it with the number of steps in the raw data to estimate the
conservation of this information. To do that, we first normalize raw and sanitized data in order
to compare them in the same range of values, then we fix a threshold for each window of the
raw data corresponding to the mean plus the standard deviation of the signal in the window.
Then we count the number of peaks above the threshold and look at the corresponding sanitized
window if we count the same number of peaks with the same threshold. We then compute a
Peak Acceleration Threshold [16] from the raw data used to compute the number peaks 2 as an
estimator of the number of steps detected by the analytic application from the received data.
Privacy To assess the level of privacy of DySan, we rely on the accuracy of inferring the
sensitive attribute (i.e., the gender). The accuracy is comprised within 0 and 1. An accuracy of
1 means the classifier has not made any prediction mistake, and an accuracy of 0.5 corresponds
to a random guess (in case of balanced dataset), means the inability of the classifier to predict
the gender.
5 Evaluation
We carried out an extensive evaluation of DySan. In this section, we present the results by
highlighting important features of DySan, namely the utility and privacy trade-off (Section 5.1),
and the advantage of dynamic sanitized model selection (Section 5.2). Results reported in this
section are the average over 10 repetitions of each experiments. The computation of the different
global models (each corresponding to a precise set of hyperparameters) has been parallelized on
a hybrid GPU/CPU computing farm.
5.1 Utility and Privacy trade-off
We evaluate here the capacity of an analytics application receiving the sanitized data from the
mobile application to infer the gender of the user and its activity. We compare the performance
of several classifiers that could be used by the application, namely a gradient boosting classifier
(GB), a multi-layer perceptron (MLP), a decision tree (DT), a random forest (RF), a logistic
regression (LR) and also two CNNs with the same architectures than the Predictor and the
Discriminator (DySan). Figure 3 reports the accuracy for the gender and the activity with the
2We used Adaptiv: An Adaptive Jerk Pace Buffer Step Detection Algorithm (https://github.com/
danielmurray/adaptiv)
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different classifiers as well as in case of using the raw data. First of all, results show that without
any protection (i.e., on raw data) the application is able to infer the gender with 98% of accuracy,
which represent an important privacy risks. Secondly, results show that DySan successfully
decreases the privacy risk while limiting the loss of activity detection. Indeed, with the sanitized
data, an analytics application is only able to infer the gender up to 60% of accuracy. In term of
utility, depending to the classifier, the accuracy of the activity recognition varies between 90%
and 86% which represents only a small drop compared to using raw data.
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Figure 3: The sanitized data provided by DySan drastically decreases the privacy risk compared
to using raw data while limiting the loss of activity detection.
The utility of the sanitized data is not just about the classification of activities but also about
more precise information on the activity level. Then to show that DySan allows to keep relevant
information in the signal allowing to conduct further analysis, we consider here the computation
of the number of steps from the signal. Following the step detection method presented in 4.3,
Table 1 shows that with DySan we can find almost all the steps detected from raw data with
less than 5% of errors. We compared this result with baselines: the sanitized signals appears
to be much more noisy and the step detection is greatly impacted with more than 64% steps
over-detected for Olympus, more than 29 % for MSDA and more than 12% of errors for GEN.
The method ORF is not considered here because it only extracts features and the signal is not
preserved, prohibiting at the same time further analysis.
Steps
Raw data 14387
DySan 13699 (-4.88 %)
GEN 12817 (-12.25%)
Olympus 23658 (+64.44%)
MSDA 18624 (+29.45%)
Table 1: The sanitized signal of DySan appears to be much more useful for step detection than
comparative approaches.
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Lastly, we compare DySan against comparative baselines. As depicted on Figure 4, results
show that DySan outperforms other approaches by limiting the gender inference to 47% while
only reducing the accuracy of activity recognition by 3% compared to without any protection
(i.e., using raw data). In addition, results also show the performance improvement provided by
the evolution of the approaches based on adversarial networks. GEN, Olympus, and then MSDA
gradually reduce the gender inference according to the considered features (an accuracy from
96% to 63%). DySan then makes this gender inference as precise as a random guess with an
accuracy of 51%.
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Figure 4: DySan provides the best utility and privacy trade-off compared to comparative base-
lines.
Interesting enough, we were not able to reproduce the results of GEN reported in [13]. Indeed,
this original paper reports an accuracy of 94% for the activity recognition and 64% for the gender
inference for the same dataset (MotionSense) compared to 95% and 96%, respectively in our
experiments.
5.2 Dynamic Sanitizer Model Selection
During its training phase, DySan computes the sanitizer models corresponding to all possible
utility and privacy trade-off by exploring the range of values for the hyperparameters α and
λ. We evaluate here the capacity of DySan in its online phase to dynamically select the best
sanitizer model according to the incoming data of the user. Firstly, we compute the accuracy for
both the gender inference and the activity recognition when the sanitizer model is fixed for all
the users. In this case which represents the behaviors of all comparative baselines, the considered
model is the one which provides the best performance in average for all the users. Secondly, we
compare this static solution against DySan where the sanitizer model is dynamically selected
according to the incoming data. In this case, the selected model is the one which provides the
smallest accuracy in term of gender inference according to the current user.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show for a static and a dynamic sanitizer model selection, the distri-
bution of the accuracy for both the gender inference and the activity recognition, respectively,
over the population of users for MotionSense and MobiAct dataset. Firstly, results show that
the accuracy in both cases is highly heterogeneous over the population of users (excepting for
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Figure 5: The dynamic sanitizer model selection does not significantly impact the activity recog-
nition.
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Figure 6: By dynamically selecting the best sanitizer model over time for each user, DySan
greatly improved the protection against gender inference.
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the utility for MotionSense dataset where most of the users benefit from an important accu-
racy). This high heterogeneity reflects the fact that the selected models is not adapted for all
users. However, results secondly show that the dynamic model selection significantly reduces the
gender inference (around 20% and 5% less accurate in average for MotionSense and MobiAct,
respectively). In term of utility, accuracy in both cases is instead similar. Lastly, as DySan was
trained on MotionSense dataset and tested on MobiAct, we also show a good transferability to
new users unseen by DySan.
6 Related Works
With the availability of wearable and personnal devices, there have been a growing research on
the use of collected data for quantifying various aspects of personnal life, such as the number
of calories consumed, the blood pressure, etc. A growing litterature concern the use of data for
predicting the physical activities performed by users, let it be for either medical, insurance or
various other reasons. We refer the interested reader to the surveys [17] and [18] on machine
learning and deep learning techniques applied for predicting the type of activities performed.
In this section, we compare our approach with other existing techniques that protect sensitive
information in sensor data while retaining data utility. First, we focus on approaches used
as baselines previously in the paper. [13] is the only one which focus on the gender as the
sensitive information. [12] and [15] in their case, focus on the re-identification only while [14]
apply their approach on several applications like object recognition or action recognition with
several data types such as images or motion sensors. In the case adversarial approach that
use autoencoder, output corresponding to the sensitive information can be extracted from the
representation produced by the encoder [19] , the decoder [14] which also correspond to our
approach, or both the encoder and the decoder [15] for data sanitization.
Specific to the sensor data generation, SenseGen [20] is a deep learning architecture for
protecting users privacy by generating synthetic sensor data. Unfortunately, they did not provide
any garantee on the protection.
To enlarge with other applications basing on protecting sensitive informations using adversar-
ial methods, [21] use a VGAN to transform face images in order to hide facial expression of the
users that can be used to reveal their identity while preserving generic expressions. Adversarial
approaches can also be used to hide sensitive information such as text in images [22] or identity
information in the fingerprints [23].
From a broader privacy perspective, [24] proposes an adversarial network technique to min-
imize the amount of mutual information between a sensitive attribute and useful data while
bounding the amount of distortion introduced. They applied their solution on a synthetic and a
computer vision dataset. Inspired from [24], authors in [25] have developed a method for learning
an optimal privacy protection mechanism also inspired from GAN, which they have applied to
location privacy. In [26], authors have proposed an approach called table-GAN, which aim at
preserving privacy by generating synthetic data. By suppressing one-to-one relationship and
limiting the quality of dataset reconstruction re-identification attacks are rendered less perfor-
mant. They compared their approach with standard privacy techniques such as k-anonymity,
t-closeness.
7 Conclusion
We presentedDySan, a privacy-preserving framework which sanitizes motion sensor data in order
to prevent unwanted inference of sensitive information. At the same time, DySan preserves as
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much as possible the useful information for activity recognition and other estimators of physical
activity monitoring. Results show that DySan drastically reduces the risk of gender inference
without impacting the ability to detect its activity or to monitor the number of steps. We also
show that the dynamic sanitized model selection of DySan successfully adapts the protection to
each user. Lastly, we also compared our approach with existing approaches and demonstrated
that DySan provides better control over privacy-utility trade-off.
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A Neural Network Architecture
We provide in this section details about the underlying neural networks of DySan.
A.1 Discriminator Net
1. Input (125,6)
2. Conv1D (64, kernel_size=6, stride=1, activation=ReLU)
3. AvgPool1D(kernel_size=2, stride=2)
4. BatchNorm1D(100, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1)
5. Dropout(p=0.5)
6. Dense(64, activation=ReLU)
7. Dense(2, activation=softmax)
A.2 Predictor Net
1. Input (125,6)
2. Conv1D (100, kernel_size=6, stride=1, activation=ReLU)
3. AvgPool1D(kernel_size=2, stride=2)
4. BatchNorm1D(100, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1)
5. Conv1D(100, kernel_size=5, stride=1, activation=ReLU)
6. AvgPool1d(kernel_size=2, stride=2)
7. Conv1D(160, kernel_size=5, stride=1, activation=ReLU)
8. AvgPool1d(kernel_size=2, stride=2)
9. Conv1D(160, kernel_size=5, stride=1, activation=ReLU)
10. AvgPool1d(kernel_size=2, stride=2)
11. Dropout(p=0.5)
12. Dense(64, activation=ReLU)
13. Dense(4, activation=softmax)
A.3 Sanitizer Net
1. Input (125,6)
2. Conv1D (64, kernel_size=6, stride=1,)
3. Conv1D (128, kernel_size=5, stride=1)
4. Dense(128)
5. Dense(64, activation=LeakyReLU(0.01))
6. Dense(64)
7. Dense(128)
8. Deconv1D (128, kernel_size=5, stride=1)
9. Deconv1D (64, kernel_size=5, stride=1, activation=softmax)
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